There was much journalistic disparagement of “negative campaigning”, especially negative ads during our recent election. This exasperates me. Negative comments about one’s political opponents are a staple of our politics - as anyone who has watched federal or provincial question period can attest.
What matters in an election are dirty ads where the three levels of grammar, which are utilized in film or video: aural, visual and intellectual, can be juxtaposed in ways that unfair messages are transmitted that are difficult for opponents to rebut.
A good example was the highly effective Conservative ad on the sponsorship scandal which showed faceless men crumpling up $50 and $100 bills while carousel music plays in the background.
Subscribe To
Posts
All Comments
Sunday, July 11, 2004
Thursday, July 01, 2004
The most important question about this election
The evidence, anecdotal and otherwise, seems clear. There was a large-scale shifting of votes from Conservative and NDP to Liberal over the final weekend. The question is why. My guess is that the reason for switch was a stew of a number of items:
For many I think the impression was that despite Harper’s efforts to dispel the notion, many in Ontario believed that the new Conservatives were identical to the old Alliance in terms of social conservatism. It wasn’t Liberal attack ads that truly established this impression. Rather it was Harper constantly being undermined by other MP’s candidly disclosing views at odds with the efforts of the leader to portray an image of moderation: Cheryl Gallant on abortion; Scott Reid on bilingualism; Randy White at the end of the campaign on the Charter of Rights and the role of the courts was undoubtedly of special importance.
Conservative MP John Reynolds also identifies Ralph Klein’s comments on health care as a key factor. See this Toronto Star report. It had the same impact as the examples above. A perceived key ally appeared to undermine Harper’s stated commitment to medicare. In addition, the popular big city mayors in Toronto and Vancouver, David Miller and Larry Campbell, attacked the Conservatives commitment to cities late in the campaign comparing their policies unfavourably with the Liberals. One could add other factors but the general impact for those who fled to the Liberals was the creation of a noxious stew they were anxious to avoid.
The contradictions raised doubts among an electorate that did not seek radical change. Safety was the Liberal government devil they knew, and if that meant not casting their first choice vote for the NDP, or a frustrated desire to punish the Liberals for the sponsorship scandal by voting Conservative or BQ, at least life would go on as the electorate knew it, in the interim.
This is a lesson the Conservatives need to absorb. Their failure to win national elections is not because of disunity on the right, which is what they belived going into this campaign. It is because they are seen by the public as too far to the right and too extreme, exactly reflecting the charges levied by the likes of Joe Clark, Scott Brison, Keith Martin and many others. If John Tory, at one time the principal secretary to Bill Davis, wins the leadership of the Ontario Progressive Conservatives in September, a precedent will have been established that could cause a national Conservative Party, fixated on their perception that the Mike Harris regime was actually popular in Ontario, to reflect on its direction going forward.
For many I think the impression was that despite Harper’s efforts to dispel the notion, many in Ontario believed that the new Conservatives were identical to the old Alliance in terms of social conservatism. It wasn’t Liberal attack ads that truly established this impression. Rather it was Harper constantly being undermined by other MP’s candidly disclosing views at odds with the efforts of the leader to portray an image of moderation: Cheryl Gallant on abortion; Scott Reid on bilingualism; Randy White at the end of the campaign on the Charter of Rights and the role of the courts was undoubtedly of special importance.
Conservative MP John Reynolds also identifies Ralph Klein’s comments on health care as a key factor. See this Toronto Star report. It had the same impact as the examples above. A perceived key ally appeared to undermine Harper’s stated commitment to medicare. In addition, the popular big city mayors in Toronto and Vancouver, David Miller and Larry Campbell, attacked the Conservatives commitment to cities late in the campaign comparing their policies unfavourably with the Liberals. One could add other factors but the general impact for those who fled to the Liberals was the creation of a noxious stew they were anxious to avoid.
The contradictions raised doubts among an electorate that did not seek radical change. Safety was the Liberal government devil they knew, and if that meant not casting their first choice vote for the NDP, or a frustrated desire to punish the Liberals for the sponsorship scandal by voting Conservative or BQ, at least life would go on as the electorate knew it, in the interim.
This is a lesson the Conservatives need to absorb. Their failure to win national elections is not because of disunity on the right, which is what they belived going into this campaign. It is because they are seen by the public as too far to the right and too extreme, exactly reflecting the charges levied by the likes of Joe Clark, Scott Brison, Keith Martin and many others. If John Tory, at one time the principal secretary to Bill Davis, wins the leadership of the Ontario Progressive Conservatives in September, a precedent will have been established that could cause a national Conservative Party, fixated on their perception that the Mike Harris regime was actually popular in Ontario, to reflect on its direction going forward.
Wednesday, June 30, 2004
How the riding by riding forecast performed.
I have now compared the predicted winner in my seat forecasting model to the actual winner in each constituency (on the basis of the preliminary results).
I have used the actual provincial vote shares as the input into the model. There is considerable confusion about seat prediction vs the polls. I find that it is common for many to confuse polling error with the error in seat prediction. I used the actual election day vote share because if the polls were perfectly accurate this is what one would get. It is almost impossible to predict the outcome in every riding accurately even with the perfect poll, so any forecast model will have error, but one should get the best results by using the most accurate polling data available, which is, by definition, the actual vote share.
Many still wonder what use this is since it comes afterwards, but almost all who read the polls during an election make an inference about outcome so I think seat projection models have a role to play. As we compare the poll numbers with the actual vote shares in an election, so we ought to compare the actual outcome in each riding with what the model predicts. When the final validated results are available in a few months I will compare the difference between my predicted and the actual percentage outcome for each candidate in each constituency.
In making predictions I do not calculate a predicted outcome for the three territorial ridings. In reporting results I simply assume that the incumbents there will be re-elected and report out a total of 308.
For the 305 constituencies using the actual provincial vote shares, the model correctly predicts the outcome in 273, and makes an error in 32, for a success rate of 89.5%. The model correctly predicted the outcome in all the seats in Alberta, PEI and Newfoundland. There were 2 errors in Nova Scotia, 1 in New Brunswick, 2 in Quebec, 16 in Ontario, 1 Manitoba, 4 in Saskatchewan (by far the weakest performance), and 3 in B.C.
The national total from all this was: L - 137, Cons - 95, NDP - 22, BQ - 54, Other - 0, close the actual results.
I have been doing this modelling for awhile and this was actually one of my better nights, although normally the model is better than 80% accurate.
The model numbers from last week's polls were nowhere near the final seat outcome, but that is principally because a reported average 4% Liberal lead in Ontario became an actual 13% Liberal lead. Not surprisingly, a shift on this scale has a huge impact on the results generated by the forecast model.
I have used the actual provincial vote shares as the input into the model. There is considerable confusion about seat prediction vs the polls. I find that it is common for many to confuse polling error with the error in seat prediction. I used the actual election day vote share because if the polls were perfectly accurate this is what one would get. It is almost impossible to predict the outcome in every riding accurately even with the perfect poll, so any forecast model will have error, but one should get the best results by using the most accurate polling data available, which is, by definition, the actual vote share.
Many still wonder what use this is since it comes afterwards, but almost all who read the polls during an election make an inference about outcome so I think seat projection models have a role to play. As we compare the poll numbers with the actual vote shares in an election, so we ought to compare the actual outcome in each riding with what the model predicts. When the final validated results are available in a few months I will compare the difference between my predicted and the actual percentage outcome for each candidate in each constituency.
In making predictions I do not calculate a predicted outcome for the three territorial ridings. In reporting results I simply assume that the incumbents there will be re-elected and report out a total of 308.
For the 305 constituencies using the actual provincial vote shares, the model correctly predicts the outcome in 273, and makes an error in 32, for a success rate of 89.5%. The model correctly predicted the outcome in all the seats in Alberta, PEI and Newfoundland. There were 2 errors in Nova Scotia, 1 in New Brunswick, 2 in Quebec, 16 in Ontario, 1 Manitoba, 4 in Saskatchewan (by far the weakest performance), and 3 in B.C.
The national total from all this was: L - 137, Cons - 95, NDP - 22, BQ - 54, Other - 0, close the actual results.
I have been doing this modelling for awhile and this was actually one of my better nights, although normally the model is better than 80% accurate.
The model numbers from last week's polls were nowhere near the final seat outcome, but that is principally because a reported average 4% Liberal lead in Ontario became an actual 13% Liberal lead. Not surprisingly, a shift on this scale has a huge impact on the results generated by the forecast model.
What Happened with the Polls
I have finished a full comparison of the polls to the preliminary results and can add a little to yesterday's posts.
There was indeed a shift to the Liberals at the end of the campaign. However, it was confined to Ontario and Quebec. Interestingly, there was a distinct migration from Conservative and NDP intentions in Quebec to the Liberals in addition a shift from the Bloc. The final impact meant that instead of the mid-20's the Liberals wound up at almost 34% in Quebec.
In Ontario when you compare just the last three polls (Reid, Ekos and Léger) you find the Liberals 6% higher on voting day, the Conservatives 3.2% lower and the NDP 2.2% lower. My guess is that many Liberals in Ontario became in effect shaken loose from their traditional loyalties by the combined impact of the McGuinty budget and the sponsorship scandal, but only focused on the federal choice and its implications in the last week. Learning from the polls and the published seat projections (which I think were close to the mark at the time despite all the silly criticism they are getting now), the Liberals in Ontario returned home for the reasons now being cited in the media.
In Quebec, I think the impact of the Landry statement was the difference in the late movement. It came simply from federalists who were upset that the Bloc and PQ would interpret Bloc success as a mandate for a renewed push on sovereignty.
All of the shift at the national level can be explained by the movement in Ontario and Quebec. The shifting around elsewhere is small and appears to me simply within the usual margin of error.
There was indeed a shift to the Liberals at the end of the campaign. However, it was confined to Ontario and Quebec. Interestingly, there was a distinct migration from Conservative and NDP intentions in Quebec to the Liberals in addition a shift from the Bloc. The final impact meant that instead of the mid-20's the Liberals wound up at almost 34% in Quebec.
In Ontario when you compare just the last three polls (Reid, Ekos and Léger) you find the Liberals 6% higher on voting day, the Conservatives 3.2% lower and the NDP 2.2% lower. My guess is that many Liberals in Ontario became in effect shaken loose from their traditional loyalties by the combined impact of the McGuinty budget and the sponsorship scandal, but only focused on the federal choice and its implications in the last week. Learning from the polls and the published seat projections (which I think were close to the mark at the time despite all the silly criticism they are getting now), the Liberals in Ontario returned home for the reasons now being cited in the media.
In Quebec, I think the impact of the Landry statement was the difference in the late movement. It came simply from federalists who were upset that the Bloc and PQ would interpret Bloc success as a mandate for a renewed push on sovereignty.
All of the shift at the national level can be explained by the movement in Ontario and Quebec. The shifting around elsewhere is small and appears to me simply within the usual margin of error.
Tuesday, June 29, 2004
Polls - Post Mortem 2
A brief comment on the polls.
It appears that there was significant opinion movement during the last three days after the final polls right up to voting day, but it was principally in Ontario. I haven't completed a comprehensive review yet but it is clear that in Ontario about 3% of those intending to vote Conservative and about 2% of those intending to vote NDP in Ontario switched to the Liberals making all the difference in this election. Instead of a lead of about 4%, the Liberals ended up with a lead over the Conservatives of 13% with a weaker than anticipated NDP. In other regions I can't find significant movement. There was movement the last week in Quebec, but the Leger polls picked that up.
I heard Stephen Harper tonight blaming his troubles in Ontario entirely on NDP supporters voting against him out of fear. However, he was only partially right and ignored the (slightly) larger phenomenon.
The last week polls elsewhere had no more error than one might ordinarily expect, and the very last poll by Léger in Quebec was quite accurate.
It appears that there was significant opinion movement during the last three days after the final polls right up to voting day, but it was principally in Ontario. I haven't completed a comprehensive review yet but it is clear that in Ontario about 3% of those intending to vote Conservative and about 2% of those intending to vote NDP in Ontario switched to the Liberals making all the difference in this election. Instead of a lead of about 4%, the Liberals ended up with a lead over the Conservatives of 13% with a weaker than anticipated NDP. In other regions I can't find significant movement. There was movement the last week in Quebec, but the Leger polls picked that up.
I heard Stephen Harper tonight blaming his troubles in Ontario entirely on NDP supporters voting against him out of fear. However, he was only partially right and ignored the (slightly) larger phenomenon.
The last week polls elsewhere had no more error than one might ordinarily expect, and the very last poll by Léger in Quebec was quite accurate.
Post Mortem 1
It appears that almost all the difference between the election outcome and the last pre-campaign polls was last minute switching in Ontario including a fair bit of NDP to Liberal strategic voting. This is the first time I can recall such a late shift in Canada.
As for my seat projection model it appears to have worked about as well as one can expect. The large errors in the seat totals stem from the difference between what the polls said would happen in Ontario, and what actually happened.
When I input the preliminary regional vote shares from cbc.ca I get the following outcome nationally: Liberal - 137 (Current actual is 135), Conservative - 95 (Current actual is 99), NDP - 22 (Current actual is 19), and BQ - 54, the same as their current total.
Seat by seat comparison will come later but it looks like, even based on those notoriously inaccurate pre-election day polls, that I correctly identified the winner in every seat in Alberta and all but two in Quebec.
As for my seat projection model it appears to have worked about as well as one can expect. The large errors in the seat totals stem from the difference between what the polls said would happen in Ontario, and what actually happened.
When I input the preliminary regional vote shares from cbc.ca I get the following outcome nationally: Liberal - 137 (Current actual is 135), Conservative - 95 (Current actual is 99), NDP - 22 (Current actual is 19), and BQ - 54, the same as their current total.
Seat by seat comparison will come later but it looks like, even based on those notoriously inaccurate pre-election day polls, that I correctly identified the winner in every seat in Alberta and all but two in Quebec.
Monday, June 28, 2004
Closing tick
Sometimes one can see the equivalent of the stock market's closing tick in politics. It is definitely there I think in the last few polls out of Quebec that show a trend back to the Liberals. Combined with the silent federalist vote, a well-established phenomenon, it could make for at least a modest disappointment for Mr. Duceppe.
The final polls published in the campaign finished calling people on Thursday night, so any effect from the weekend won't show up until tonight.
I did just hear this afternoon about some fragmentary confidential polling that is a little hard to interpret, but it suggests that the Conservatives may be just a little weaker, and the Liberals a little stronger, than the closing polls reported. And the race is close enough that, if this information reflects a real trend, then the Conservative minority pointed to by the weekend polls may turn out to have been a mirage.
In the end I am just curious to know how it turns out.
Once digested, I will write some analysis of the results and own up to how well (or poorly) the model performed.
The final polls published in the campaign finished calling people on Thursday night, so any effect from the weekend won't show up until tonight.
I did just hear this afternoon about some fragmentary confidential polling that is a little hard to interpret, but it suggests that the Conservatives may be just a little weaker, and the Liberals a little stronger, than the closing polls reported. And the race is close enough that, if this information reflects a real trend, then the Conservative minority pointed to by the weekend polls may turn out to have been a mirage.
In the end I am just curious to know how it turns out.
Once digested, I will write some analysis of the results and own up to how well (or poorly) the model performed.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)